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MULTI-RECEIVER AUTHENTICATION SCHEME FOR MULTIPLE
MESSAGES BASED ON LINEAR CODES
JUN ZHANG, XINRAN LI AND FANG-WEI FU
Abstract. In this paper, we construct an authentication scheme for multi-receivers and
multiple messages based on a linear code C. This construction can be regarded as a gener-
alization of the authentication scheme given by Safavi-Naini and Wang [8]. Actually, we
notice that the scheme of Safavi-Naini and Wang is constructed with Reed-Solomon codes.
The generalization to linear codes has the similar advantages as generalizing Shamir’s se-
cret sharing scheme to linear secret sharing sceme based on linear codes [1, 6, 5, 7, 9]. For
a fixed message base field Fq, our scheme allows arbitrarily many receivers to check the
integrity of their own messages, while the scheme of Safavi-Naini and Wang has a con-
straint on the number of verifying receivers V 6 q. And we introduce access structure in
our scheme. Massey [5] characterized the access structure of linear secret sharing scheme
by minimal codewords in the dual code whose first component is 1. We slightly modify the
definition of minimal codewords in [5]. Let C be a [V, k] linear code. For any coordinate
i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,V}, a codeword ~c in C is called minimal respect to i if the codeword ~c has
component 1 at the i-th coordinate and there is no other codeword whose i-th component
is 1 with support strictly contained in that of ~c. Then the security of receiver Ri in our au-
thentication scheme is characterized by the minimal codewords respect to i in the dual code
C⊥ . Authentication scheme, linear codes, secret sharing, minimal codewords, substitution
attack.
1. Introduction
1.1. Background. One of the important goals of cryptographic scheme is authentication,
which is concerned with the approaches of providing data integrity and data origin vali-
dation between two communication entities in computer network. Traditionally, it simply
deals with the data authentication problem from a single sender to a single receiver. With
the rapid progress of network communication, the urgent need for providing data authenti-
cation has escalated to multi-receiver and/or multi-sender scenarios. However, the original
point-to-point authentication techniques are not suitable for multi-point communication.
In the multi-receiver authentication model, a sender broadcasts an authenticated message
such that all the receivers can independently verify the authenticity of the message with
their own private keys. It requires a security that malicious groups of up to a given size
of receivers can not successfully impersonate the transmitter, or substitute a transmitted
message. Desmedt et al. [4] gave an authentication scheme of single message for multi-
receivers. Safavi-Naini and Wang [8] extended the DFY scheme [4] to be an authentication
scheme of multiple messages for multi-receivers.
The receivers independently verify the authenticity of the message using each own pri-
vate key. So multi-receiver authentication scheme involves a procedure of secret sharing.
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To introduce the linear secret sharing scheme based on linear codes, we recall some defi-
nitions in coding theory.
Let FVq be the V-dimensional vector space over the finite field Fq with q elements. For
any vector ~x = (x1, x2, · · · , xV ) ∈ FVq , the Hamming weight Wt(~x) of ~x is defined to be the
number of non-zero coordinates, i.e.,
Wt(~x) = # {i | 1 6 i 6 V, xi , 0} .
A linear [V, k] code C is a k-dimensional linear subspace of FVq . The minimum distance
d(C) of C is the minimum Hamming weight of all non-zero vectors in C, i.e.,
d(C) = min{Wt(~c) |~c ∈ C \ {~0}} .
A linear [V, k] code C ⊆ FVq is called a [V, k, d] linear code if C has minimum distance d. A
vector in C is called a codeword of C. A matrix G ∈ Fk×Vq is call a generator matrix of C
if rows of G form a basis for C. A well known trade-off between the parameters of a linear
[V, k, d] code is the Singleton bound which states that
d 6 V − k + 1 .
A [V, k, d] code is called a maximum distance separable (MDS) code if d = V − k + 1. The
dual code C⊥ of C is defined as the set{
~x ∈ FVq | ~x · ~c = 0 for all ~c ∈ C
}
,
where ~x · ~c is the inner product of vectors ~x and ~c, i.e.,
~x · ~c = x1c1 + x2c2 + · · · + xVcV .
The secret sharing scheme provides security of a secret key by “splitting” it to several
parts which are kept by different persons. In this way, it might need many persons to
recover the original key. It can achieve to resist the attack of malicious groups of persons.
Shamir [9] used polynomials over finite fields to give an (S , T ) threshold secret sharing
scheme such that any T persons of the S shares can uniquely determine the secret key
but any T − 1 persons can not get any information of the key. A linear secret sharing
scheme based on a linear code [5] is constructed as follows: encrypt the secret to be the
first coordinate of a codeword and distribute the rest of the codeword (except the first secret
coordinate) to the group of shares. McEliece and Sarwate [7] pointed out that the Shamir’s
construction is essentially a linear secret sharing scheme based on Reed-Solomon codes.
Also as a natural generalization of Shamir’construction, Chen and Cramer [1] constructed
a linear secret sharing scheme based on algebraic geometric codes.
The qualified subset of a linear secret sharing scheme is a subset of shares such that
the shares in the subset can recover the secret key. A qualified subset is call minimal if
any share is removed from the qualified subset, the rests cannot recover the secret key.
The access structure of a linear secret sharing scheme consists of all the minimal qualified
subsets. A codeword ~v in a linear code C is said to be minimal if ~v is a non-zero codeword
whose leftmost nonzero component is a 1 and no other codeword~v′ whose leftmost nonzero
component is 1 has support strictly contained in the support of ~v. Massey [5, 6] showed that
the access structure of a linear secret sharing scheme based on a linear code are completely
determined by the minimal codewords in the dual code whose first component is 1.
Proposition 1 ([5]). The access structure of the linear secret-sharing scheme correspond-
ing to the linear code C is specified by those minimal codewords in the dual code C⊥ whose
first component is 1. In the manner that the set of shares specified by a minimal codeword
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whose first component is 1 in the dual code is the set of shares corresponding to those
locations after the first in the support of this minimal codeword.
In both schemes of Desmedt et al. [4] and Safavi-Naini and Wang [8], the key distri-
bution is similar to that in Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [9], using polynomials. Both
schemes are (V, k) threshold authentication scheme, i.e., any malicious groups of up to k−1
receivers can not successfully ( unconditional secure in the meaning of information theory)
impersonate the transmitter, or substitute a transmitted message to any other receiver, while
any k receivers or more receivers can successfully impersonate the transmitter, or substitute
a transmitted message to any other receiver. Actually, in the proof of security of the au-
thentication scheme of Safavi-Naini and Wang, the security is equivalent to the difficulty
to recover the private key of other receivers. So the security essentially depends on the
security of key distribution.
In this paper, we use general linear codes to generalize the scheme of Safavi-Naini and
Wang. One advantage is that our scheme allows arbitrarily many verifying receivers for a
fixed message base field Fq, while the scheme of Safavi-Naini and Wang has a constraint on
the number of verifying receivers V 6 q. We introduce the concept of minimal codeword
respect to each coordinate, which helps to characterize the capability of resisting substitu-
tion attack in our authentication scheme, similarly to the linear secret sharing scheme [6].
It guarantees higher security for some important receivers.
1.2. Our Construction and Main Results. In a multi-receiver authentication model for
multiple messages, a trusted authority choose random parameters as the secret key and
generates shares of private keys secretly. Then the trusted authority transmits a private
key to each receiver and secret parameters to the source. For each fixed message, the
source computes the authentication tag using the secret parameters and sends the message
adding with the tag. In the verification phase, the receiver verify the integrity of each
tagged message using his private key. There are some malicious receivers who collude to
perform an impersonation attack by constructing a fake message, or a substitution attack
by altering the message content such that the new tagged message can be accepted by some
other receiver or specific receiver.
In this subsection, we present our construction of an authentication scheme based on
a linear code for multi-receivers and multiple messages. It will be shown that the ability
of our scheme to resist the attack of the malicious receivers is measured by the minimum
distance of the dual code and minimal codewords respect to specific coordinate in the dual
code.
Let C ⊆ FVq be a linear code with minimum distance d(C) > 2. And assume that the
minimum distance of the dual code C⊥ is d(C⊥) > 2. Fix a generator matrix G of C
G =

g1,1 g1,2 · · · g1,V
g2,1 g2,2 · · · g2,V
...
...
. . .
...
gk,1 gk,2 · · · gk,V

.
Then make G public. Our scheme is as follows.
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• Key generation: A trusted authority randomly chooses parameters
A =

a0,1 a0,2 · · · a0,k
a1,1 a1,2 · · · a1,k
...
...
. . .
...
aM,1 aM,2 · · · aM,k

∈ F(M+1)×kq .
• Key distribution: The trusted authority computes
B = A ·G =

b0,1 b0,2 · · · b0,V
b1,1 b1,2 · · · b1,V
...
...
. . .
...
bM,1 bM,2 · · · bM,V

.
Then the trusted authority distributes each receiver Ri the i-th column of B as his
private key, for i = 1, 2, · · · ,V .
• Authentication tag: For message s ∈ Fq, the source computes the tag map
L = [L1, L2, · · · , Lk] : Fq → Fkq
s 7→ [L1(s), L2(s), · · · , Lk(s)] ,
where the map Li (i = 1, 2, · · · , k) is defined by
Li(s) =
M∑
j=0
a j,is j .
Instead of sending the message s ∈ Fq, the source actually sends the authenticated
messages ~x of the form1
~x = [s, L(s)] ∈ F1+kq .
• Verification:The receiver Ri accepts the message [s, L(s)] if ∑Mt=0 stbt,i = ∑kj=1 L j(s)g j,i.
Under the integrity of the tagged message, one can easily verify the following
M∑
t=0
stbt,i =
M∑
t=0
st
k∑
j=1
at, jg j,i =
k∑
j=1
(
M∑
t=0
at, jst)g j,i =
k∑
j=1
L j(s)g j,i .
Here, we call the result
∑M
t=0 s
tbt,i the label of Ri for message s.
If we take C to be the Reed-Solomon code, i.e., the generator matrix G is of the form
(1.1) G =

1 1 · · · 1
x1 x2 · · · xV
x21 x
2
2 · · · x
2
V
...
...
. . .
...
xk−11 x
k−1
2 · · · x
k−1
V

,
for pairwise distinct x1, x2, · · · , xV ∈ Fq, then the scheme is the scheme of Safavi-Naini
and Wang [8].
The security of the above authentication scheme is summarized in the following theo-
rems.
1In general, we can first use a hash function h : {0, 1}∗ → Fq to hash the message s, then send the tagged
message [s, L(h(s))].
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Theorem 2. The scheme we constructed above is a unconditionally secure multi-receiver
authentication code against a coalition of up to (d(C⊥) − 2) malicious receivers in which
every key can be used to authentication up to M messages.
More specifically, if we consider what a coalition of malicious receivers can success-
fully make a substitution attack to one fixed receiver Ri. To characterize this malicious
group, we slightly modify the definition of minimal codeword in [5].
Definition 1. Let C be a [N, k] linear code. For any i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, a codeword ~c in C is
called minimal respect to i if the codeword ~c has component 1 at the i-th location and there
is no other codeword whose i-th component is 1 with support strictly contained in that of
~c.
Then we have
Theorem 3. For the authentication scheme we constructed, we have
(i): The set of all minimal malicious groups that can successfully make a substitution
attack to the receiver Ri is determined completely by all the minimal codewords
respect to i in the dual code C⊥.
(ii): All malicious groups that can not produce a fake authenticated message which
can be accepted by the receiver Ri are one-to-one corresponding to subsets of
[V] \ {i} such that each of them together with i does not contain any support of
minimal codeword respect to i in the dual code C⊥, where [V] = {1, 2, · · · ,V}.
Compared with Safavi-Naini and Wang’s scheme, our scheme has an important advan-
tage. The scheme of Safavi-Naini and Wang is a (V, k) threshold authentication scheme,
so any coalition of k malicious receivers can easily make a substitution attack to any other
receiver. While in our scheme, by Theorem 3, sometimes it can withstand the attack of
coalitions of k or more malicious receivers to some fixed important receiver Ri. And it
is in general NP-hard to find one (or list all) coalition(s) of malicious receivers with the
minimum members that can make a substitution attack to the receiver Ri. So in this sense,
our scheme has better security than the previous one.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give the security analysis
of our scheme. In Section 3, we show the relationship between the security of our scheme
and parameters of the linear code.
2. Security Analysis of Our Authentication Scheme
In this section, we present the security analysis of our scheme. From the verification
step, we notice that a tagged message [s, v1, v2, · · · , vk] can be accepted by the receiver Ri
if and only if
∑M
t=0 s
tbt,i =
∑k
j=1 v jg j,i. So in order to make a substitution attack to Ri, it
suffices to know the label ∑Mt=0 stbt,i for some s ∈ Fq not sent by the transmitter, then it is
trivial to construct a tag (v1, v2, · · · , vk) such that ∑Mt=0 stbt,i = ∑kj=1 v jg j,i.
Indeed, we will find that the security of the above authentication scheme depends on the
hardness of finding the key matrix A from a system of linear equations. Suppose a group
of K malicious receivers collaborate to recover A and make a substitution attack. Without
loss of generality, we assume that the malicious receivers are R1,R2, · · · ,RK . Suppose
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s1, s2, · · · , sM have been sent. Each Ri has some information about the key A:

1 s1 s21 · · · s
M
1
1 s2 s22 · · · s
M
2
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 sM s2M · · · sMM

· A =

L1(s1) L2(s1) · · · Lk(s1)
L1(s2) L2(s2) · · · Lk(s2)
...
...
. . .
...
L1(sM) L2(sM) · · · Lk(sM)

and
A ·

g1,i
g2,i
...
gk,i

=

b0,i
b1,i
...
bM,i

.
The group of malicious receivers combines their equations, and they get a system of linear
equations
(2.1)


1 s1 s21 · · · s
M
1
1 s2 s22 · · · s
M
2
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 sM s2M · · · s
M
M

· A =

L1(s1) L2(s1) · · · Lk(s1)
L1(s2) L2(s2) · · · Lk(s2)
...
...
. . .
...
L1(sM) L2(sM) · · · Lk(sM)

,
A ·

g1,1 g1,2 · · · g1,K
g2,1 g2,2 · · · g2,K
...
...
. . .
...
gk,1 gk,2 · · · gk,K

=

b0,1 b0,2 · · · b0,K
b1,1 b1,2 · · · b1,K
...
...
. . .
...
bM,1 bM,2 · · · bM,K

.
Lemma 4. Let P be the subspace of Fkq generated by {g j | j = 1, 2, · · · , K}, where g j
represents the j-th column of the generator matrix G. Suppose K0 = dim P 6 k − 1.
Then there exists exact qk−K0 matrices A satisfying the system of equations (2.1).
Proof. Denote
S M =

1 s1 s21 · · · s
M
1
1 s2 s22 · · · s
M
2
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 sM s2M · · · sMM

.
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Rewrite the matrix A of variables ai, j as a single column of k(M + 1) variables. Then
System (2.1) becomes
(2.2)

S M
S M
. . .
S M
g1,1~IM+1 g2,1~IM+1 · · · gk,1~IM+1
g1,2~IM+1 g2,2~IM+1 · · · gk,2~IM+1
...
...
. . .
...
g1,K~IM+1 g2,K~IM+1 · · · gk,K~IM+1

·

a0,1
a1,1
...
aM,1
a0,2
a1,2
...
aM,2
...
a0,k
a1,k
...
aM,k

= T
where ~IM+1 is the identity matrix with rank (M+1) and T is the column vector of constants
in System (2.1) with proper order. Notice that the space generated by rows of S M is con-
tained in the space FM+1q generated by gi, j~IM+1 if gi, j , 0. So the rank of the big matrix of
coefficients in System (2.2) equals to
M · k + K0
which is less than k(M + 1), the number of variables. So System (2.2) has qk(M+1)−kM−K0 =
qk−K0 solutions, i.e., System (2.1) has qk−K0 solutions. 
Remark 1. In [8], they gave a constructive proof of Lemma 4 in the case that G is of the
form (1.1). The method here can be used for a general class of systems of linear equations
over a field F: {
D · X = C1
X · Z = C2
where X is a m×n matrix of variables, the coefficient matrices D ∈ Fg×m with rank 6 m−1
and Z ∈ Fn×h with rank 6 n − 1, the constant matrices C1 ∈ Fg×n and C2 ∈ Fm×h. Then
solutions of the system in Fm×n has (m − g)(n − h)-dimensional hypersurface in the space
Fm×n.
Note that if C [n, k, d = n − k + 1] is an MDS code, e.g., Reed-Solomon code, then
whenever K 6 k − 1 the vectors in any K-subset of columns of G are linearly independent.
By Lemma 4, the security of our authentication scheme follows.
Theorem 5. The scheme we constructed above is an unconditionally secure multi-receiver
authentication scheme against a coalition of up to (d(C⊥)−2) malicious receivers in which
every key can be used to authentication up to M messages.
Proof. Suppose the source receiver has sent messages s1, s2, · · · , sM . It is enough to con-
sider the case that K = d(C⊥) − 2 malicious receivers R1, · · · ,RK have received the M
messages, since in this case they know the most information about the key matrix A.
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What they try to do is to guess the label b0,K+1+b1,K+1sM+1+b2,K+1s2M+1+· · ·+bM,K+1sMM+1
for some sM+1 < {s1, s2, · · · , sM} and construct a vector (v1, v2, · · · , vk) such that
k∑
i=1
vigi,K+1 = b0,K+1 + b1,K+1sM+1 + b2,K+1s2M+1 + · · · + bM,K+1sMM+1 .
Then the fake message [sM+1, v1, v2, · · · , vk] can be accepted by RK+1.
Because any K = d(C⊥) − 2 columns of the generator matrix G is linearly independent
over Fq, otherwise there exist x1, · · · , xK ∈ Fq such that
∑K
j=1 x j~g j = ~0 where ~g j is the
j-th column of G, then the dual code C⊥ will have a codeword (x1, · · · , xK , 0, · · · , 0) with
Hamming weight6 d(C⊥)−2 which is a contradiction. By Lemma 4, there exists qk−d(C⊥)+2
matrices A satisfying the system of equations (2.1).
For any sM+1 < {s1, s2, · · · , sM}, we define the label map
ϕsM+1 : {Solutions of System (2.1)} −→ Fq
A 7→ (1, sM+1, s2M+1, · · · , sMM+1)A

g1,K+1
g2,K+1
...
gk,K+1

.
Then we claim:
(1): ϕsM+1 is surjective.
(2): for any y ∈ Fq, the number of the inverse image of y is #ϕ−1sM+1(y) = qk−d(C
⊥)+1
.
So the information held by the colluders allows them to calculate q equally likely different
labels for sM+1 and hence their probability of success is 1/q which is equal to that of
guessing a label b0,K+1 + b1,K+1sM+1 + b2,K+1s2M+1 + · · · + bM,K+1s
M
M+1 for sM+1 randomly
from Fq. And hence we finish the proof of the theorem.
Next, we prove our claim. As K+1 = d(C⊥)−1, g1, g2, · · · , gK+1 is linearly independent
over Fq, otherwise the dual code C⊥ will have a codeword with Hamming weight 6 d(C⊥)−
1 which is impossible by the definition of minimum distance of a code. Then choose
k−K−1 = k−d(C⊥)+1 extra columns of G such that they combining with g1, g2, · · · , gK+1
form a basis of Fkq. Without loss of generality, we assume the first k columns of G is linearly
independent of Fq. For any P ∈ F(M+1)×(k−d(C
⊥ )+1)
q , the system of linear equations
(2.3)


1 s1 s21 · · · s
M
1
1 s2 s22 · · · s
M
2
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 sM s2M · · · s
M
M

· A =

L1(s1) L2(s1) · · · Lk(s1)
L1(s2) L2(s2) · · · Lk(s2)
...
...
. . .
...
L1(sM) L2(sM) · · · Lk(sM)

,
A ·

g1,1 g1,2 · · · g1,K
g2,1 g2,2 · · · g2,K
...
...
. . .
...
gk,1 gk,2 · · · gk,K

=

b0,1 b0,2 · · · b0,K
b1,1 b1,2 · · · b1,K
...
...
. . .
...
bM,1 bM,2 · · · bM,K

,
A ·

g1,K+2 g1,K+3 · · · g1,k
g2,K+2 g2,K+3 · · · g2,k
...
...
. . .
...
gk,K+2 gk,K+3 · · · gk,k

= P ,
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has q solutions by Lemma 4, saying A1, A2, · · · , Aq. The solutions A1, A2, · · · , Aq are also
solutions of System (2.1). Next, we show
{ϕsM+1(A j) | j = 1, 2, · · · , q} = Fq .
Otherwise, there are two solutions A j1 and A j2 such that
(1, sM+1, s2M+1, · · · , sMM+1)A j1

g1,K+1
g2,K+1
...
gk,K+1

= (1, sM+1, s2M+1, · · · , sMM+1)A j2

g1,K+1
g2,K+1
...
gk,K+1

.
Then we have

1 s1 s21 · · · s
M
1
1 s2 s22 · · · s
M
2
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 sM+1 s2M+1 · · · s
M
M+1

A j1

g1,1 g1,2 · · · g1,k
g2,1 g2,2 · · · g2,k
...
...
. . .
...
gk,1 gk,2 · · · gk,k

=

1 s1 s21 · · · s
M
1
1 s2 s22 · · · s
M
2
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 sM+1 s2M+1 · · · s
M
M+1

A j2

g1,1 g1,2 · · · g1,k
g2,1 g2,2 · · · g2,k
...
...
. . .
...
gk,1 gk,2 · · · gk,k

.
But matrices

1 s1 s21 · · · s
M
1
1 s2 s22 · · · s
M
2
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 sM+1 s2M+1 · · · s
M
M+1

,

g1,1 g1,2 · · · g1,k
g2,1 g2,2 · · · g2,k
...
...
. . .
...
gk,1 gk,2 · · · gk,k

are invertible. So A j1 = A j2 which contradicts to the condition A j1 , A j2 . And hence, the
statement (1) holds.
Next, we prove (2). Any one solution of System (2.1) gives one P ∈ F(M+1)×(k−d(C⊥ )+1)q ,
while corresponding to such a P there are q solutions of System (2.1) from the proof of (1).
In this way, we partition solutions of System (2.1) into qk−d(C⊥)+1 parts such that each part
contains q elements. Also from the proof of (1), the image of each part under ϕsM+1 is Fq.
So for any y ∈ Fq, the number of the inverse image of y is #ϕ−1sM+1(y) = qk−d(C
⊥)+1
.

Remark 2. From the proofs of Lemma 4 and Theorem 5, the coalition of malicious re-
ceivers B can successfully make a substitution attack to the receiver Ri if and only if ~gi
is contained in the subspace of Fkq generated by {~g j | j ∈ B}, where ~g j represents the j-th
column of the generator matrix G. In this case, they can recover the private key of Ri. This
is the motivation of the next section.
Next, we give a toy example to illustrate Lemma 4 and Theorem 5.
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Example 1. Let Fq = F5. The M = 3 messages sent are s1 = 1, s2 = 2, s3 = 4. The C is a
systematic code with the generator matrix
G =

1 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 0
0 1 0 0 0 2 2 3 2
0 0 1 0 0 3 1 3 4
0 0 0 1 0 4 0 0 2
0 0 0 0 1 2 1 1 4

.
One can check that the dual code C⊥ has minimum distance d(C⊥) = 5. The trusted
authority randomly chooses A ∈ F4×55 , for instance,
A =

3 2 2 0 2
0 4 3 0 2
0 1 2 3 1
3 3 0 1 3
 .
Then the trusted authority computes
B = AG =

3 2 2 0 2 2 4 1 0
0 4 3 0 2 1 3 3 3
0 1 2 3 1 2 0 0 0
3 3 0 1 3 4 0 4 0

and distributes the i-th column of B to the receiver Ri as his private key.
Suppose R1,R2,R3 are corrupted and they have seen the authenticated messages

x1
x2
x3
 =

1 1 0 2 4 3
2 2 3 1 0 4
3 4 4 4 4 3
 ,
then they want to substitute one of the authenticated messages during the transmission by
a new codeword [s, L(s)] that can be accepted by one of the other receivers. They have
information about the key matrix A:
(2.4)


1 1 1 1
1 2 4 3
1 3 4 2
 A =

1 0 2 4 3
2 3 1 0 4
4 4 4 4 3
 ,
A

1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
0 0 0
0 0 0

=

3 2 2
0 4 3
0 1 2
3 3 0
 .
This system of linear equations has 25 solutions

3 0 0 3 2
4 1 3 2 3
2 0 1 4 4
0 1 3 0 4
 + a1

0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 4 1
4 0 0 0 0
 + a2

0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 1 4 1 4

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(0, 4, 3, 2, 0, 2) (0, 3, 1, 1, 4, 3) (0, 2, 4, 0, 3, 4) (0, 1, 2, 4, 2, 0) (0, 0, 0, 3, 1, 1)
(4, 4, 4, 2, 0, 0) (4, 3, 2, 1, 4, 1) (4, 2, 0, 0, 3, 2) (4, 1, 3, 4, 2, 3) (4, 0, 1, 3, 1, 4)
(3, 4, 0, 2, 0, 3) (3, 3, 3, 1, 4, 4) (3, 2, 1, 0, 3, 0) (3, 1, 4, 4, 2, 1) (3, 0, 2, 3, 1, 2)
(2, 4, 1, 2, 0, 1) (2, 3, 4, 1, 4, 2) (2, 2, 2, 0, 3, 3) (2, 1, 0, 4, 2, 4) (2, 0, 3, 3, 1, 0)
(1, 4, 2, 2, 0, 4) (1, 3, 0, 1, 4, 0) (1, 2, 3, 0, 3, 1) (1, 1, 1, 4, 2, 2) (1, 0, 4, 3, 1, 3)
where a1, a2 ∈ F5. For s4 = 4 and any i = 4, 5, · · · , 9, we have the label map
ϕs4,Ri : {Solutions of System (2.4)} −→ Fq
A 7→ (1, sM+1, s2M+1, · · · , sMM+1)A

g1,i
g2,i
...
gk,i

.
Let ϕs4 = (ϕs4,R4 , ϕs4,R5 , · · · , ϕs4,R9). Then the images of ϕs4 are
Notice that for any i > 4, ϕs4,Ri is surjective and for any y ∈ Fq, the number of the inverse
image of y is #ϕ−1s4 (y) = 5. One can check the properties of ϕs4,Ri about surjection and
uniform distribution of the images for s4 = 0 also hold.
Actually, we can verify that even the coalition of R1,R2,R3,R4 can successfully generate
a fraudulent codeword [s4, L(s4)] for any other Ri still only in a probability 1/5 which is
the success probability of randomly choosing a label from F5 for a fake message.
3. Code-based Authentication Scheme andMinimal Codewords
In the previous section, we considered that any coalition of K malicious receivers can
not obtain any information about any other receiver’s label to make a substitution attack.
To consider a weak point, we propose that for a fixed receiver Ri, what a coalition of
malicious receivers that can not get any information of the label of Ri. By Theorem 5, we
have seen that any coalition of up to (d(C⊥)−2) malicious receivers can not generate a valid
codeword [s, L(s)] for Ri in a probability better than guessing a label from Fq randomly for
the fake message s.
Denote [V] = {1, 2, · · · ,V} and P = {R1,R2, · · · ,RV}. Without any confusion, we
identify the index set {1, 2, · · · ,V} and the receiver set {R1,R2, · · · ,RV }.
Definition 2. A subset of V − 1 receivers P \ {Ri} is call an adversary group to Ri if
their coalition can not obtain any information of the label of Ri when they want to make
a substitution attack to Ri. Define ti(C) to be the largest integer τi such that any subset
A ⊆ P \ {Ri} with cardinality τi is an adversary group to Ri.
Definition 3. A subset of P \ {Ri} that can successfully make a substitution attack to Ri is
call a substitution group to Ri. Moreover, a substitution group is call minimal if any one
receiver is removed from the group, then the rests can not obtain any information of the
label of Ri. Define ri(C) to be the smallest integer ρi such that any subset B ⊆ P \ {Ri} with
cardinality ρi is a substitution group to Ri.
For any A ⊆ [V], πA is the projection of FVq to F|A|q defined by
πA((x1, x2, · · · , xV )) = (x j) j∈A,
for any (x1, x2, · · · , xV ) ∈ FVq . And denote by πi = π{i} for short. For any receiver Ri, the
substitution groups to Ri are completely characterized as follows.
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Proposition 6. For any receiver Ri, the following conditions are equivalent:
(i): B ⊆ P \ {Ri} is a substitution group to Ri;
(ii): ~gi is contained in the subspace of Fkq generated by {~g j | j ∈ B}, where ~g j repre-
sents the j-th column of the generator matrix G;
(iii): there exists a codeword ~c ∈ C⊥ such that
πi(~c) = 1 and πBc(~c) = ~0 ,
where Bc = (P \ {Ri}) \ B is the complement of B in P \ {Ri};
(iv): there is an Fq-linear map
fB,i : πB(C) −→ Fq
such that fB,i(πB(~c)) = πi(~c) for all ~c ∈ C;
(v): there is no codeword ~c ∈ C such that
πi(~c) = 1 and πB(~c) = ~0 .
Proof. By Remark 2, conditions (i) and (ii) are equivalent.
First, we show that there exists a codeword ~c ∈ C⊥ such that πi(~c) , 0. If not, that is,
for any codeword ~c ∈ C⊥, it holds πi(~c) = 0. Then the unit vector with the unique nonzero
component 1 on the i-th coordinate belongs to C, which contradicts to the assumption
d(C) > 2.
So there exists a codeword ~c ∈ C⊥ such that πi(~c) = 1 by the linearity of C. The rest of
the proof that conditions (ii) and (iii) are equivalent is clear.
(iii)=⇒(iv). For any codeword ~y ∈ C⊥ with
πi(~y) = 1 and πBc(~y) = ~0 ,
we have ∑
j∈B
π j(~y)π j(~c) + πi(~c) = 0
for any codeword ~c ∈ C. So define fB,i : πB(C) → Fq by setting
fB,i(πB(~c)) = −
∑
j∈B
π j(~y)π j(~c),
for all ~c ∈ C. Then fB,i satisfies the condition.
(iv)=⇒(iii). From the proof of “(iii)=⇒(iv)”, we see that the required codeword in C⊥
is actually the coefficients of the map
φB,i = πi − fB,i.
(iv)=⇒(v). If the statement (v) does not hold, then there exists a codeword ~c ∈ C such
that
πi(~c) = 1 and πB(~c) = ~0 ,
which contradicts to fB,i(πB(~c)) = πi(~c).
(v)=⇒(iv). A map
fB,i : πB(C) −→ Fq
satisfying fB,i(πB(~c)) = πi(~c) for all ~c ∈ C is always linear over Fq by the linearity of C. So
if the map
fB,i : πB(C) −→ Fq
satisfying fB,i(πB(~c)) = πi(~c) for all ~c ∈ C does not exist, then there exist two different
codewords ~c, ~c′ ∈ C such that
πi(~c) , πi(~c′) and πB(~c) = πB(~c′) .
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That is, the codeword ~x = ~c − ~c′ ∈ C satisfies
πi(~x) = πi(~c − ~c′) , 0 and πB(~x) = πB(~c − ~c′) = ~0 ,
which contradicts to (v). 
By Proposition 6, adversary groups to Ri can be completely characterized by
Proposition 7. For any receiver Ri, the following conditions are equivalent:
(i): A ⊆ P \ {Ri} is an adversary group to Ri;
(ii): ~gi is not contained in the subspace of Fkq generated by {~g j | j ∈ A};
(iii): there is no codeword ~c ∈ C⊥ such that
πi(~c) = 1 and πAc(~c) = ~0 ;
(iv): there exists a codeword ~c ∈ C such that
πi(~c) = 1 and πA(~c) = ~0 .
Corollary 8. (i): For any i = 1, 2, · · · ,V, we have
d(C⊥) − 1 6 ri(C) 6 V − d(C) + 1 ,
and
max{ri(C) | i = 1, 2, · · · ,V} = V − d(C)+ 1, min{ri(C) | i = 1, 2, · · · ,V} − 1 = d(C⊥)− 1 .
(ii): For any i = 1, 2, · · · ,V, we have
d(C⊥) − 2 6 ti(C) 6 ri(C) − 1 ,
and
min{ti(C) | i = 1, 2, · · · ,V} = d(C⊥) − 2 .
Proof. (i) Suppose B ⊆ P\{Ri} is any substitution group to Ri. By Proposition 6 (iii), there
is a codeword ~c ∈ C⊥ such that
πi(~c) = 1 and πBc(~c) = ~0 .
Then we have
d(C⊥) 6 wt(~c) 6 |B| + 1 .
So
ri(C) > |B| > d(C⊥) − 1 .
For any B ⊆ P\{Ri} with cardinality> V−d(C)+1, it is obvious that any codeword ~c ∈ C
with πi(~c) = 1 (in the proof of Proposition 6, we have seen that such a codeword does exist.)
has πB(~c) , ~0. Otherwise, the minimum distance d(C) 6 V − (V − d(C) + 1) = d(C) − 1.
So by Proposition 6 (v), it follows
ri(C) 6 V − d(C) + 1 .
Let ~c be a codeword in C with minimum Hamming weight. Denote by S the support of
~c. Let B = [V] \ S . Then by Proposition 6 (v), B is not a substitution group to Ri for any
i ∈ S . So
max{ri(C) | i = 1, 2, · · · ,V} > max{ri(C) | i ∈ S } > |B| + 1 = V − d(C) + 1 .
And hence
max{ri(C) | i = 1, 2, · · · ,V} = V − d(C) + 1 .
To prove min{ri(C) | i = 1, 2, · · · ,V} − 1 = d(C⊥) − 1, it suffices to show
ri(C) = d(C⊥) − 1
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for some i = 1, 2, · · · ,V . Let ~y be a codeword in C⊥ with minimum Hamming weight.
Denote by T the support of ~y. For any i ∈ T , T \ {i} is a substitution group to Ri with
cardinality d(C⊥) − 1. On the other hand, by Proposition 6 (ii), any subset of P \ {Ri} with
cardinality 6 d(C⊥) − 2 could not be a substitution group to Ri. So
ri(C) = d(C⊥) − 1
for any i ∈ T .
(ii) ti(C) 6 ri(C)−1 by the definition. For any B ⊆ P\{Ri} with cardinality 6 d(C⊥)−2,
there is no codeword ~c ∈ C⊥ such that
πi(~c) = 1 and πBc(~c) = ~0 .
If not, then there is a codeword ~c ∈ C⊥ such that
πi(~c) = 1 and πBc(~c) = ~0 .
Then C⊥ has a codeword ~c with Hamming weight 6 |B| + 1(6 d(C⊥) − 1) which is impos-
sible. So by Proposition 7, B is an adversary group to Ri. And hence
d(C⊥) − 2 6 ti(C) .
Since
d(C⊥) − 2 6 ti(C) 6 ri(C) − 1 ,
we have
d(C⊥) − 2 6 min{ti(C) | i = 1, 2, · · · ,V} 6 min{ri(C) | i = 1, 2, · · · ,V} − 1 = d(C⊥) − 2 .
So
min{ti(C) | i = 1, 2, · · · ,V} = d(C⊥) − 2 .

By Corollary 8, it is natural to get
Corollary 9. For any receiver Ri, we have
(i): Subsets of P \ {Ri} with cardinality > (V − d(C) + 1) are substitution groups to
Ri.
(ii): Subsets of P \ {Ri} with cardinality 6 (d(C⊥) − 2) are adversary groups to Ri.
(iii): For MDS codes C, subsets of P \ {Ri} with cardinality 6 (d(C⊥) − 2) are all the
adversary groups to Ri.
There is a gap in Corollary 9 in general we do not known whether a subset of size in
the gap is a substitution group to Ri or not for general code-based authentication scheme.
Actually, it is NP-hard to list all substitution groups to Ri in general. Even for authentica-
tion scheme based on algebraic geometric codes from elliptic curves, it is already NP-hard
(under RP-reduction) to list all substitution groups to Ri [2, 3].
By Proposition 6, we obtain the main result of this section, a generalization of Proposi-
tion 1:
Theorem 10. For the authentication scheme we constructed, we have
(i): The set of all minimal substitution groups to the receiver Ri is determined com-
pletely by all the minimal codewords respect to i in C⊥.
(ii): All adversary groups to the receiver Ri are one-to-one corresponding to subsets
of [V] \ {i} such that each of them together with i does not contain any support of
minimal codeword respect to i in C⊥.
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(2 2 1 0 1 0 4 0 0) (0 1 0 3 1 2 0 2 2) (0 3 0 0 1 3 3 4 4) (3 0 0 4 1 1 3 0 1) (2 0 0 0 1 2 4 2 1)
(3 0 2 0 1 0 2 2 0) (0 0 3 1 1 0 2 4 2) (0 4 0 1 1 1 2 0 0) (0 0 4 4 1 2 4 0 4) (4 0 2 4 1 4 1 0 0)
(1 0 1 4 1 0 2 0 3) (0 0 1 0 1 1 3 2 3) (0 2 2 0 1 4 3 0 2) (1 0 0 1 1 3 0 4 1) (2 0 3 4 1 3 0 0 2)
(0 2 0 4 1 0 4 3 3) (4 0 0 3 1 0 2 3 1) (0 0 2 3 1 3 0 3 0) (1 4 0 0 1 0 1 3 0) (3 3 0 2 1 0 0 3 4)
(4 3 3 0 1 0 0 4 0) (3 1 4 2 1 2 0 0 0) (0 3 1 3 1 0 0 0 1) (0 0 0 2 1 4 1 1 1) (2 4 0 4 1 4 0 1 0)
(4 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 3) (4 0 4 0 1 3 0 2 4) (0 1 4 0 1 0 3 1 0)
Table 1.
{ 1, 2, 3, 7 } { 2, 4, 6, 8, 9 } { 2, 6, 7, 8, 9 } { 1, 4, 6, 7, 9 } { 1, 6, 7, 8, 9 }
{ 1, 3, 7, 8 } { 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 } { 2, 4, 6, 7 } { 3, 4, 6, 7, 9 } { 1, 3, 4, 6, 7 }
{ 1, 3, 4, 7, 9 } { 3, 6, 7, 8, 9 } { 2, 3, 6, 7, 9 } { 1, 4, 6, 8, 9 } { 1, 3, 4, 6, 9 }
{ 2, 4, 7, 8, 9 } { 1, 4, 7, 8, 9 } { 3, 4, 6, 8 } { 1, 2, 7, 8 } { 1, 2, 4, 8, 9 }
{ 1, 2, 3, 8 } { 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 } { 2, 3, 4, 9 } { 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 } { 1, 2, 4, 6, 8 }
{ 1, 2, 6, 9 } { 1, 3, 6, 8, 9 } { 2, 3, 7, 8 }
Table 2.
{ 1, 2, 3, 8, 9 } { 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 } { 3, 4, 6, 8, 9 } { 1, 3, 4, 6, 7 } { 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 } { 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 }
{ 2, 3, 6, 8, 9 } { 1, 3, 6, 8, 9 } { 2, 4, 6, 7, 9 } { 1, 4, 6, 7, 8 } { 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 } { 1, 4, 6, 7, 9 }
{ 1, 2, 4, 7, 8 } { 1, 2, 4, 7, 9 } { 1, 2, 6, 7, 8 } { 1, 2, 6, 7, 9 } { 1, 2, 3, 4, 9 } { 1, 3, 6, 7, 9 }
{ 2, 3, 6, 7, 8 } { 1, 3, 6, 7, 8 } { 2, 3, 6, 7, 9 } { 1, 2, 4, 6, 8 } { 1, 2, 4, 6, 7 } { 1, 2, 3, 4, 8 }
{ 2, 3, 4, 6, 9 } { 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 } { 1, 3, 4, 6, 8 } { 1, 2, 4, 6, 9 } { 2, 4, 7, 8, 9 } { 1, 2, 3, 7, 8 }
{ 1, 2, 3, 7, 9 } { 2, 6, 7, 8, 9 } { 1, 2, 6, 8, 9 } { 1, 4, 7, 8, 9 } { 2, 3, 4, 6, 8 } { 3, 6, 7, 8, 9 }
{ 3, 4, 6, 7, 9 } { 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 } { 1, 3, 4, 6, 9 } { 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 } { 1, 2, 4, 8, 9 } { 1, 3, 4, 8, 9 }
{ 1, 6, 7, 8, 9 } { 1, 2, 3, 6, 9 } { 1, 2, 7, 8, 9 } { 2, 3, 4, 8, 9 } { 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 } { 1, 3, 4, 7, 9 }
{ 1, 4, 6, 8, 9 } { 2, 4, 6, 8, 9 } { 2, 3, 4, 7, 9 } { 1, 3, 4, 7, 8 } { 1, 2, 3, 6, 8 } { 1, 3, 7, 8, 9 }
{ 2, 3, 7, 8, 9 } { 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 }
Table 3.
Example 2. Continue with Example 1, minimum codewords respect to 5 in C⊥ are list in
Table 1.
Since coordinate 5 is in the support of any minimal codeword respect to 5, we exclude 5
from all supports of these codewords. Then we get supports of minimal codewords exclud-
ing 5, see Table 2.
So any substitution group to the receiver R5 must contain at least one set in Table 2. And
subset of P \ {R5} that does not contain any one set in Table 1 can not make a substitution
attack to the receiver R5 successfully in a probability better than 1/5 (1/5 is the success
probability of randomly choosing a label from F5 for a fake message) using their knowledge
of the key matrix A. From Table 2, notice that most subsets of P\{R5} with cardinality 4 can
not generate a fake message that can accepted by R5 successfully in a probability better
than 1/5, even subsets of P \ {R5} with cardinality 5 can not, such as shown in Table 3.
While in the scheme of Safavi-Naini and Wang with a [9, 5] Reed-Solomon code (the field
must have cardinality > 9), any subset of P \ {R5} with cardinality 5 can successfully
recover the private key of R5 and hence they can easily make a substitution attack to R5.
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4. Conclusion
In this paper, we construct an authentication scheme for multi-receivers and multiple
messages based on linear code C [V, k, d]. There are many advantages. Compared with
schemes based on MACs or digital signatures which depend on computational security.
Our scheme is an unconditional secure authentication scheme, which can offer robustness
against a coalition of up to (d(C⊥)− 2) malicious receivers. Similarly as the generalization
of Shamir’s secret sharing scheme to linear secret sharing sceme based on linear codes,
compared with the scheme of Safavi-Naini and Wang [8] which has a constraint on the
number of verifying receivers that can not be larger than the size of the finite field. Our
scheme allows arbitrary receivers for a fixed message base field. And, for some important
receiver, coalitions of k or more malicious receivers can not yet make a substitution attack
on the receiver more efficiently than randomly guessing a label from the finite field for
a fake message. While the authentication scheme of Safavi-Naini and Wang is a (V, k)
threshold authentication scheme, any k of the V receivers can easily produce a fake message
that can be accepted by the receiver.
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